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COMMENTS
STANDING FOR STATE AND FEDERAL
LEGISLATORS
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the general heading of subject matter jurisdiction
lies the concept of justiciability.1 Justiciability contains four
main components: ripeness, mootness, political question, and
standing.2 Each is a threshold issue,' requiring an indepen-
dent judicial analysis." Should a plaintiff fail to meet the nec-
essary test for any one of the four, a federal court lacks sub-
ject matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of the case.
Where standing and political questions are presented in a sin-
gle case, standing should be considered first.'
Standing has been called the "most widely discussed and
debated of the judicially created doctrines of justiciability."
0. 1983 by Ernest A. Benck, Jr.
1. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 3-7 (1978 & Supp. 1981).
2. Id. at §§ 3-9 to 3-17.
3. See 6A J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 57.11 -
57.15 (2d ed. 1979 & Supp. 1981).
4. Id.
5. Gladstone, Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979) (standing); Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (ripeness); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (political ques-
tion); Atherton Mills v. Johnson, 259 U.S. 13 (1922) (mootness).
6. American Jewish Congress v. Vance, 575 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1974) (dicta); see also infra note 42.
7. J. RADCLIFFE, THE CASE-OR-CONTROVERSY PROVISION 186 (1978). In Flast v.
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), Justice Harlan, in his dissent, characterized standing as a
"word game played by secret rules." Id. at 129. See also L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 3-
18, at 81. To illustrate the difficulty and confusion of its status in American law, here
are two examples of an attempt to find a definition for standing:
In legal usage, "standing" is basically a means by which courts can ac-
cept or refuse jurisdiction, and it generally alludes to the capacity of a
party to obtain judicial relief of an administrative action. The term
"standing" should not be confused with the doctrine of standing to sue;
the latter doctrine is generally directed towards the capacity of a plain-
tiff to present his case before a district court ab initio.
81A C.J.S. Standing at 255-56 (1977) (footnotes omitted). The dictionary provides no
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This comment will analyze the standing problems unique to
those plaintiffs suing in their capacity as elected state or fed-
eral legislators." While legislators9 need only meet the same
standard required of all citizens,10 particular problems exist
because of the unique nature of the status upon which legisla-
tors assert their standing to sue. As a result, several judicial
tests have been developed to deal with the type of legislative
injury alleged. Just as the generalized test for standing has
changed over the years," the standing tests for legislators
have evolved and adapted to the changes in the more genera-
lized test. These tests lack clear and consistent application by
the courts. The lack of consistency is due, at least in part, to
the failure of the Supreme Court to hear a standing case with
a legislative plaintiff in over a decade. 12 It appeared that the
definition for standing, outside of common usages, but does define "standing to sue."
"Standing to sue" means that a party has sufficient stake in an other-
wise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolution of that contro-
versy. Standing is a concept utilized to determine if a party is suffi-
ciently affected so as to insure that a justiciable controversy is presented
to the court. The requirement of "standing" is satisfied if it can be said
that the plaintiff has a legally protectible and tangible interest at stake
in the litigation.
BLACK'S LAW DiCTIONARY 1260 (rev. 5th ed. 1979) (citations omitted). The dictionary
has blended the two ideas. For purposes of this comment, "standing to sue" is synon-
ymous with "standing."
8. It has been noted that such an action is a necessary check on the executive
branch of government. Comment, Congressional Standing to Challenge Executive
Action, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1366 (1974). Indeed, the Court has stated that its decisions
often "[affect] the relationships between the co-equal arms of the National Govern-
ment [and that] the effect is ... most vivid when a federal court declares unconstitu-
tional an act of the Legislative or Executive Branch." Valley Forge Christian College
v. Americans Unified for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 473 (1982)
(warning that this very result also calls into question the "continued effectiveness of
the federal courts in performing that role.") Id. It should be emphasized, however,
that the legislative branch is itself subject to being checked by legislators. See, e.g.,
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1968).
9. For purposes of this comment, "legislator" will be used to describe United
States representatives from both houses of Congress, and to describe members of any
house of the various state legislatures. Additionally, instances where candidates for
legislative office are suing, or where certain legislators are appointed by the entire
legislature to represent it in court, are also designated "legislator" cases; however,
cases arising from these latter two situations will not be discussed. See Schiaffo v.
Helstoski, 492 F.2d 413 (3d Cir. 1974) (candidate); Senate Select Comm. on Presiden-
tial Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (selected legislators
representing the legislature or an official legislative body).
10. Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 204 (1977).
11. Tucker, The Metamorphosis of The Standing to Sue Doctrine, 17 LAw F.
911 (1972).
12. See infra note 69 and accompanying text. See also infra note 72.
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Court might shed light on this area, however, after it granted
certiorari to a federal district court case, Idaho v. Freeman,",
in which legislators were implicitly found to have standing to
challenge ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment. Unfor-
tunately, the issue became moot because the deadline for rati-
fication passed."' Because the Amendment has again been
submitted to the state for ratification," section IV of this
comment will attempt to predict the outcome of a Court deci-
sion on the standing issue should a factual situation analogous
to that in Idaho v. Freeman arise again. This prediction will
be based upon the current status of the tests for legislative
standing. Suggestions for improving the tests will also be
proposed.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF STANDING IN FEDERAL
COURTS
The word "standing" is a recent addition to American le-
gal jargon.' 6 It appears to have its origins in the English par-
liamentary practice of allowing only those "[o]pponents of leg-
islative proposals . . . or 'interests' [who] were 'directly and
specially affected . .' "1 to be heard.
The English requirement of a legal interest in a dispute
eventually found its way into American courts.1" Because of
13. 529 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Idaho 1981).
14. 103 S. Ct. 22 (1982).
15. San Jose Mercury News, January 25, 1983, at B13, col. 1.
16. J. VINING, LEGAL IDENTITY 55 (1978).
17. Id. at 55-56. This procedure of establishing the right to be heard was even-
tually formalized. An opponent who could be heard was said to have locus standi.
The legislative requirement later became a judicial requirement, even though juris-
diction in the English courts was initially determined by writ and not by standing.
18. Id. The first appearance of the word standing in American law has been
traced to a headnote in the 1903 United States Supreme Court case of Davis & Far-
num Mfg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 189 U.S. 207 (1903). Another authority points out that
injury or damage was a prerequisite to being heard by a federal court as early as 1863,
although the term itself was not used. Mississippi & Mo. R.R. v. Ward, 67 U.S. (2
Black) 485 (1863). It is generally agreed, however, that Frothingham v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923), marks the "point at which the Court began to pay particular atten-
tion to the interest of the plaintiff in the matter sought to be adjudicated." Note,
Standing to Sue For Members of Congress, 83 YALE L.J. 1665, 1668 (1974). See id. at
1667 for a refutation of the assertion that Frothingham, marks the point at which
standing entered American law, pointing out that the word was never used in the
case. See also Tucker, The Metamorphosis of the Standing to Sue Doctrine, 17 LAW
F. 911, 913 (1972). But cf. Burger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is It a Consti-
tutional Requirement?, 78 YALE L.J. 816, 818-19 (1969) (asserting that Frothingham
was first). Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1950), has
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the legal interest requirement, standing "differs from all of
the other elements of justiciability by focusing primarily 'on
the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court'
and only secondarily 'on the issues he wishes to have adjudi-
cated.' "9 Despite this focus on the individual, judicial treat-
ment of standing has been accused of often being a blending
of standing, ripeness, and mootness.2 0 "Much of the law of
ripeness and mootness can be viewed as simply a convenient
way of expressing particular aspects of standing concerns."2
A. Article III: The Source of the Case or Controversy
Requirement
The scope of federal court jurisdiction is governed by ar-
ticle III of the Constitution.2" The courts are limited to only
reviewing cases in which a genuine case or controversy ex-
ists. 8 The case or controversy provision is generally seen as
been labeled the Supreme Court's first comprehensive discussion of standing. See J.
RADCLIFFE, supra note 7, at 187-88.
19. L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 3-17 at 79 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99
(1968)) (emphasis added by Tribe).
20. 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §
3531, at 230-33 (1975 & Supp. 1981) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER], (citing
Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972)); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
21. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 20, at 232.
22. The pertinent part is set out below:
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States,
and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;-to
all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Contro-
versies to which the United States shall be a party;-to Controversies
between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another
State;-Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the Supreme Court shall
have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the
Supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and
Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress
shall make.
The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by
Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes
shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State,
the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by law
have directed.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 [hereinafter cited as article III].
23. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 20, § 3521, at 236; see also Simon v. Eastern
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having four parts: 1) adversity; 2) parties with an interest in a
disputed legal right; 3) an issue susceptible to adjudication at
the present time; and 4) finality.2 4 The use of the article III
requirement "of factual or concrete injury serves only to limit
the ability of federal courts to confer standing in the absence
of [a] statute"25 and enables the courts to quickly "resolve
disputes involving only generalized grievances, or involving
only the rights or interests of third parties. 2 6
Even Congress may not expand federal court jurisdiction
beyond article 111.27 In Marbury v. Madison,2 8 the Court re-
lied on the clear language of article III prohibiting the expan-
sion of the Court's original jurisdiction.29 The Court has been
steadfast in resisting Congressional attempts to expand the
article III jurisdictional limitation. In Trafficante v. Metropol-
itan Life Insurance,8" the Court held that Congress may grant
standing rights statutorily, but only to the extent that those
rights are within the parameters established by article III.1
Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 (1975).
24. J. RADCLIFFE, supra note 7, at 43.
25. L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 80. It is also important to view federal courts as
courts of limited jurisdiction and state courts as courts of general jurisdiction.
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 20, at 44-45.
26. L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 3-19, at 82. Article III is not the sole source for
federal court jurisdiction. Removal jurisdiction is not expressly permitted by article
III or by any other provision in the Constitution. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976). Re-
moval jurisdiction has been found to be an appropriate use of the congressional power
to make laws "necessary and proper" for carrying out the tasks delegated to the na-
tional government. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 349 (1816).
The article III requirement does influence removal jurisdiction because the case re-
moved must be one which could have been brought in federal court initially. A second
exception to article III limitations is ancillary or pendant jurisdiction. See Owen
Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978). Jurisdiction is premised onjudicial economy and procedural convenience. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 20, §
3521, at 39.
27. The case most famous for this principle is Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5
Cranch) 303 (1809) (finding a jurisdictional limitation upon the federal courts despite
a statute appearing to grant unlimited jurisdiction). See also WRIGHT & MILLER,
supra note 20, § 3521, at 37; L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 3-7, at 52.
28. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
29. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 20, § 3521, at 38.
30. 409 U.S. 205 (1972).
31. Id. at 209. This limitation was cogently stated by the Court, in another case,
as follows: "Congress may, by legislation, expand standing to the full extent permit-
ted by Art. III, thus permitting litigation by one 'who otherwise would be barred by
prudential standing rules.' Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S., at 501. In no event, however,
may Congress abrogate the Art. III minima: A plaintiff must always have suffered 'a
distinct and palpable injury to himself,' ibid., that is likely to be redressed if the
requested relief is granted. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., supra at 38."
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B. The Modern Two-Prong Test
Frothingham v. Mellon12 was the Supreme Court's first
major elaboration of the modern constitutional aspect of
standing, requiring that the focus be on the plaintiff's alleged
injuries. In Frothingham, consolidated for review with Massa-
chusetts v. Mellon,8 the term "standing" was never used;
however, the Court clearly addressed the constitutional ele-
ment of standing as it is known today."4 The next major case
involving standing was Baker v. Carr" in which the Court re-
emphasized the injury requirement which a plaintiff must
demonstrate in order to satisfy article 111.36 Baker requires
that the injury suffered by the plaintiff be such that it focuses
the court's attention to that particular plaintiff, and not
merely to a claim shared equally by all citizens.37 Baker is
Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1978).
For additional cases dealing with congressional augmentation of standing in stat-
utes, see the cases listed in WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 20, § 3531, at 235 n.9. See
also J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 73 (lst ed. 1978).
For an argument that article III was not a separately articulated standing re-
quirement prior to Frothingham, and that this is the better test, see Note, Standing
to Sue for Members of Congress, supra note 18, at 1673-74. Of course, the additional
question of whether the plaintiff is a party within the group of individuals to whom
Congress intended to grant standing under the statute remains one with which the
courts must deal; see Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 100, 100-01
(1978).
32. 262 U.S. 447 (1922). See supra note 18.
33. 262 U.S. 447 (1922).
34. Id. at 480. The Court was specifically discussing the injury requirement of
article III in Frothingham: "We have no power per se to review and annul acts of
Congress on the ground that they are unconstitutional. That question may be consid-
ered only when the justification for some direct injury suffered or threatened,
presenting a justiciable issue, is made to rest upon such an act." Id. at 488. Cf. Flast
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 93 (1967) (Chief Justice Warren argued that policy reasons, not
just constitutional considerations, decided the case. However, later in the case he con-
ceded that the two are often indistinguishable). Id. at 97.
35. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (because Tennessee voters alleged that their votes for
the General Assembly were debased because of the reapportionment scheme, stand-
ing was allowed). See Note, supra note 18, at 1668.
36. "Have the appellants alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitu-
tional questions? This is the gist of the question of standing." 369 U.S. at 204.
37. As the Baker Court stated:
If such impairment does produce a legally cognizable injury, they are
among those who have sustained it. They are asserting "a plain, direct
and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their votes,"
Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. at 438, not merely a claim of "the right
possessed by every citizen to require that the Government be adminis-
1983] STANDING FOR LEGISLATORS
often the starting point for reviewing modern standing re-
quirements because the fundamental requirements articulated
in Baker have not changed.88
Standing requirements were again re-evaluated by the
Court in Flast v. Cohen.39 Like Frothingham, Flast also in-
volved a plaintiff suing in the capacity of taxpayer. The Flast
court developed a test to determine whether a plaintiff had
alleged a sufficient personal stake, and whether the taxpayer's
interests "impart[ed] the necessary concrete adverseness"4 in
order to be reviewed by a federal court. This test is known as
the "logical nexus" test because the plaintiff must show "a
logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim
sought to be adjudicated." '41 The test has two parts: "First,
the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status
and the type of legislative enactment attacked .... Secondly,
the taxpayer must establish a nexus between that status and
tered according to law .... Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129.
369 U.S. at 208. In Frothingham, the presence of such a claim prevented standing.
See supra notes 33-34 & infra note 39 and accompanying text.
38. Comment, supra note 8, at 1369. See Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706
(D. Idaho 1981). See also Markham, Standing In The Political Arena, 45 ALB. L.
REV. 932, 934 (1981).
39. 392 U.S. 83 (1968). See supra notes 18 & 34. In Flast, Chief Justice Warren,
aware of existing criticism and confusion about the Court's articulation of a standing
test, sought to clarify the standing requirements:
[Frothingham] has been the source of some confusion and the object of
considerable criticism. The confusion has developed as commentators
have tried to determine whether Frothingham establishes a constitu-
tional bar to taxpayer suits or whether the Court was simply imposing a
rule of self restraint which' was not constitutionally compelled.
Id. at 92. The Court first determined that article III was not an absolute bar to "suits
by federal taxpayers." Id. at 101. Article III was found to be a limitation on federal
court jurisdiction only to the extent that it assures that the "dispute sought to be
adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form historically
viewed as capable of judicial resolution." Id. This broad language was reduced further
to the question of whether the plaintiff has a "'personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy' [citations omitted] and whether the dispute touches upon 'the legal rela-
tions of parties having adverse legal interests.'" Id. (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204 (1962), and Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937)).
The Flast test is the strongest precedent in cases where the plaintiff asserts
standing based on his status as a taxpayer since the plaintiff's status focuses the
court's inquiry into the test to be applied: "the various rules of standing applied by
the federal courts have not been developed in the abstract. Rather, they have been
fashioned with special reference to the status asserted by the party whose standing is
challenged and to the type of question he wishes to have adjudicated." 392 U.S. at
101.
40. 392 U.S. at 101.
41. Id. at 102.
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the precise nature of the constitutional infringement
alleged.""2
In a pair of cases following Flast, the Court adapted the
Flast test to plaintiffs who alleged a status other than that of
taxpayer. In both Barlow v. Collins"s and Association of Data
Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp," the plain-
tiffs sued in their capacity as private citizens challenging ad-
ministrative action. Standing was found in both cases, a result
which prompted one commentator to declare that the cases
marked a new era of liberalized standing requirements." Al-
though the Court's reasoning was similar in both cases, Data
Processing came to represent the restatement of the two part
Flast test as it applied to nontaxpayer suits." The two prong
test,47 or two tier test as it is sometimes referred to,"s requires
that the plaintiffs first allege that they have suffered an "in-
jury in fact, economic or otherwise,"'4 e and second, that plain-
tiffs allege that they are "arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional
guarantee in question.""0
Later cases continued to refine and articulate the require-
ments of both prongs. Today, prong one is still the constitu-
42. Id. The Court made two additional points about standing. First, "it is not
relevant that the substantive issues in the litigation might be nonjusticiable." Id. at
101. This indicates that, where other possible justiciability challenges to a plaintiff's
claim are made, standing should be considered first. See American Jewish Congress v.
Vance, 575 F.2d 939, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (deciding standing before political ques-
tion); see also supra note 6. Second, the Court stated that "it is both appropriate and
necessary to look to the substantive issues ... to determine whether there is a logical
nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought to be adjudicated." 392 U.S.
at 101-02. This indicates that the merits may be considered, at least minimally, for
purposes of article III standing. See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 106 (1974).
The most recent decision by the Court on the issue of taxpayer standing involved
alleged violations of first amendment rights. Valley Forge Christian College v. Ameri-
cans United For Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982).
43. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
44. 397 U.S. 150 (1970). Discussions of this case can be found in the following:
The Supreme Court, 1969 Term, 84 HARV. L. REV. 177, 182 (1970) (calling the Data
Processing test vague); Jaffee, Standing Again, 84 HARv. L. REV. 633 (1970); Young,
Review of Supreme Court Decisions, 56 A.B.A. J. 482 (1970); Comment, Standing for
Review of the Actions by Federal Administrative Agencies: A New Test, 23 U. FLA.
L. REV. 206 (1970).
45. Markham, Standing In The Political Arena, supra note 38.
46. Comment, supra note 8, at 1370.
47. Id.
48. Markham, supra note 38, at 933.
49. 397 U.S. at 152.
50. Id. at 153.
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tional or "case or controversy" prong. It contains four subre-
quirements5 1 The plaintiff must have suffered an injury in
fact5 2 which is fairly traceable to,53 and caused by,"' the de-
fendant's acts or omissions.55 The injury must be one which is
redressable by a favorable court decision." This constitutional
prong presents the "mimimum constitutional mandate" for
standing.57 Even if the requirements of prong two are met,
standing will not be granted unless prong one is also satis-
fied.5 When met, prong one assures that the plaintiff has
"'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
51. See Note, Congressional Access To The Federal Courts, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1632, 1635 (1977). See also Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 205 n.68 (1977). But see
Idaho v. Freeman, 507 F. Supp. 706 (D. Idaho 1981) (calling prong one a three part
test because redressability and tracing may be found in the alternative). See infra
note 53.
52. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans for Separation of Church &
State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982). The injury may be actual or threatened. Id. at 472; Warth
v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499, 501 (1975) (quoting Data Processing Service Org., Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)); Linda R. S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973); Data
Processing Service Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-54 (1970). The injury may be
economic or noneconomic in nature. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1976); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1971).
And if monetary, the amount need not be substantial. United States v. SCRAP, 412
U.S. 669, 686-87 (1972). See also Markham, supra note 38, at 953-54 (arguing that
under SCRAP, loss of even a single vote in an election should be sufficient). The
injury must also be one which is suffered directly by the plaintiff, and not merely his
abstract concern about a problem of general interest. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at
263; Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at 739-40. The Court referred to this requirement as one in
which the "language of Art. III forecloses the conversion of courts of the United
States into judicial versions of college debating forums." Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at
473.
53. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights
Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1975); Oshea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 448, 498 (1974); Linda R.
S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973).
54. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 252, 505 (1975). But see L. TRIBE,
supra note 1, § 2-21 at 92-97 (criticizing the inclusion of the causation element in the
constitutional minimum). See also Freeman v. Seldin, 507 F. Supp. 706 (stating the
causation requirement to contain both redressability and tracing, so that a finding of
either is sufficient to satisfy the test).
55. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982).
56. Id. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38-39 (1975);
Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974). See also L. TRIBE,
supra note 1, § 3-10, at 56.
57. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
58. Gladstone, Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979); Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975).
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versy' as to warrant his invocation of federal court jurisdiction
and to justify exercise of the court's remedial powers on his
behalf." 59
Prong two remains the nonconstitutional prong and has
been expanded considerably beyond the original concept of
zone of interests. Its focus continues to be the prudential con-
siderations of self restraint by which the court limits its juris-
diction. 0 The plaintiff must show that his interests and legal
rights have been injured, not those of third parties.6 ' In addi-
tion, the plaintiff must show that his grievance is not so ab-
stract that it is better addressed "in the representative
branches of government, 6 2 and that his injuries fall within
the zone of interests protected by the statute or constitutional
guarantee upon which his claim is based.63 When the require-
59. Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1975) (quoting
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975)).
60. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 471-76 (1982).
61. Id. at 471-72; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500 n.12 (1975); Data
Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1970); Singleton v. Wulff,
428 U.S. 106, 112 (1975).
62. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982). See also Warth v. Seldin 422 U.S. 490, 500
(1975); Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop The War, 418 U.S. 208, 222 (1974).
63. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982). As noted in the text, the "zone of interests"
requirement originated in the Data Processing decision and encompassed the entire
prong two analysis at that time. Data Processing Service Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 152-53 (1970). In fact, as recently as 1978, one scholar isolated the two levels of
analysis used by the court in standing cases. Of the two levels, prong two was limited
to the zone of interests test. L. TRIBE, supra note 1, § 3-17, at 79-80.
At the same time, however, other scholars were asserting that the Data Process-
ing standard itself applied only in cases where standing was alleged under a statute,
and therefore founded upon a nonconstitutional claim. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J.
YOUNG, supra note 31, at 73-76 (applying the two part test but arguing that Warth
and Trafficante illustrate the standard to be used in constitutionally based injuries).
Contra L. TRIBE, supra note 1, at 80 n.4. The position of Professor Tribe appears to
be correct. References to Data Processing and the "zone of interest" test have con-
sistently been made by the Court in subsequent cases involving constitutionally based
standing. Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 475; Gladstone, Realtors v. Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,
100 n.6 (1979).
For other cases referring to the zone of interests analysis in statutory as well as
constitutional cases, see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139-40 (1978); United States
v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 196 n.18 (Powell, J., concurring); Boston Stock Exch. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 429 U.S. 318, 320 n.3 (1977); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106,
111-12 (1975); Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 641 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting). For an argument that the zone of interests analysis is entirely irrelevant
to the issue of standing, see Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208, 235-37 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Simon v. Eastern Ky. Wel-
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ments of prong two are met, the court will further balance
these prudential considerations to determine whether stand-
ing should be granted."
III. STANDING FOR LEGISLATORS
For purposes of standing, legislators receive no special
treatment." They must meet the general requirements out-
lined in the previous section. State legislators are generally af-
forded the same rights as federal legislators. 6 Legislators do,
however, have interests which are different from those of the
ordinary citizen. 7 To date, legislators have alleged three gen-
eral areas of injury unique to their status: diluted vote, usur-
pation of legislative power, and diminished effectiveness in
carrying out legislative duties absent a judicial declaration."
Each of these will be discussed separately, although it is not
uncommon for more than one type of injury to be involved in
a single case.
The voting injury is divided into two subcategories. One
involves dilution of a past vote, and the other a dilution of a
future vote. The courts have treated the two types of votes
differently. For the most part, an alleged injury to a past vote
survives the standing tests, provided the vote was on specific
legislation. Alleging injury to a future vote has been generally
fare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 n.19 (1975) (statutory reference only); Passenger
Corp. v. Passengers Ass'n, 414 U.S. 453, 469 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Blue
Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 476 (1982) (statutory reference only).
For purposes of this comment, however, prong two will include all of the articu-
lated prudential considerations, of which the zone of interests is but one. In addition,
where the zone of interests analysis is applied, the Data Processing standard as well
as those in Trafficante and Warth will be used.
64. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of
Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982).
65. Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 204 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
66. Note, supra note 18, at 1665 n.2.
67. Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
68. Injury from a diminished vote is not unique to legislators. See United Jew-
ish Org. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) (dilution of voting strength of nonwhites due to
redistricting plan in racially polarized counties); Dunn v. Bumstein, 405 U.S. 330(1972) (state durational residency requirements alleged to have illegally interfered
with the right to vote of those residents involved in interstate movement); Kramer v.
Union School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (additional requirements for eligibility to
vote in school board elections alleged unconstitutional); Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58
(1900) (city election officials' refusal to count citizen's vote in congressional election
because voter had not registered); Creel v. Freeman, 531 F.2d 286 (5th Cir. 1976) (city
residents' statutory grant allowing participation in county school board elections al-
leged as diluting votes of county residents).
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The case of Coleman v. Miller,6" although decided in
1939, is sound precedent for determining the necessary re-
quirements for legislative standing because the plaintiffs met
both prongs of what would later become the modern test. In
Coleman, twenty state senators from Kansas alleged that the
effectiveness of their past votes against state ratification of
the Child Labor Amendment 70 had been diluted by the voting
procedure used by the state legislature. In answering the de-
fendant's claim that the plaintiffs did not have an adequate
interest to invoke federal court jurisdiction, the Court stated:
"We think that these senators have a plain, direct and ade-
quate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of their
votes. 11 This finding satisfied prong one of the test as it is
applied in legislator cases. The second prong was also satis-
fied: "Petitioners come directly within the provisions of the
statute governing our appellate jurisdiction. They have set up
and claimed a right and privilege under the Constitution of
the United States to have their votes given effect and the
state court has denied that right and privilege. 72 This lan-
69. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
70. For the text of the proposed amendment see Coleman, 307 U.S. at 433 n.1.
The vote on the amendment had resulted in a tie in the Senate. The lieutenant gover-
nor cast the tie-breaking vote, which allowed the amendment to be passed. The suit
sought to prevent the defendant, Secretary of the Kansas Senate, from counting the
tie-breaking vote, and to treat the amendment as if it had not been ratified.
71. Id. at 438.
72. Id. Of lesser importance is the Supreme Court case of Powell v. McCor-
mack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). Powell is usually characterized as a case most useful for its
holdings on two other threshold questions: mootness and political question; generally
the case is useful for its discussion of separation of powers. Id. at 495-500, 518-22.
(mootness and political question). See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS 451 (10th ed. 1980 & Supp. 1981) (separation of powers). See generally
Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 62 (1969); Comment, Congressional
Exclusion: A Test of Judicial Supremacy-Powell v. McCormack, 15 N.Y.L.F. 921
(1969); Comment, Comments on Powell v. McCormack, 17 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1 (1969);
Comment, Limiting Judicial Review of Congressional Exclusion with the Political
Question Doctrine, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 182; Note, Constitutional Law-Exclusion of
Congressman Elect Who met all Constitutional Qualifications Deemed Unconstitu-
tional, 19 BUFFALO L. REV. 105 (1969) Note, Congressional Exclusion of Member-
Elect and the Political Question Doctrine, 23 Sw. L.J. 733 (1969). The alleged injury
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guage is a clear application of the prudential zone of interests
requirement.
Kennedy v. Sampson7 3 is one of the most widely cited
and better articulated decisions in this area.74 A United States
was not the result of the illegal activity of the executive branch, but was the result of
the acts of the legislative body itself. This strengthens the idea that a legislator may
suffer an injury not suffered by the legislative body as a whole. See Kennedy v.
Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 434-35 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727 (1972) for the proposition that the party seeking standing need only be
among the injured and not the most directly or seriously injured); Pressler v. Simon,
428 F.2d 302, 304 (D.D.C. 1974). But see Note, supra note 51, at 34-37 (considering
the injury to be to the legislative institution which individuals share proportionally).
Unfortunately, the Powell case has little helpful language for developing diluted vote
as a basis of injury in fact.
Subsequent to Powell, the Supreme Court has written substantially only once on
a case involving legislator standing. The case, Pressler v. Blumenthal, 434 U.S. 1028(1978), received only a summary affirmance. The district court found the congress-
man to have standing to protect a future voting right, but dismissed the case on the
merits. See also Pressler v. Simon, 428 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1976). In Pressler v.
Simon a United States congressman alleged that the procedure used to implement
federal pay increases was illegal. Traditionally, Congress fixed the increases without
presidential involvement, but in this case the President's recommendations were put
into effect without congressional approval. The congressman's right to vote on the
increases was protected by the Constitution. He was therefore able to meet both
prongs of the modern test: injury through a lost vote protected by the Constitution.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. Interestingly, the congressman alleged "not that the effi-
cacy of his legislative vote was impaired by the Executive, but rather that his vote
was impaired by the failure of other members of Congress to assume an affirmative
responsibility specifically placed on them by language of the Constitution." 428 F.
Supp. 302, 304. Unlike Powell, however, the defendant in Pressler v. Simon was the
Secretary of the Treasury, not Congress itself. Further, there was no question of a
failure to enact a law for which a congressman had already voted, or an illegal enact-
ment as in Coleman. The case, therefore, represents a relaxing of standing require-
ments where a dimininshed vote is the alleged injury. It clearly involves a potential
vote and the concept of usurpation of power.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist pointed out that the decision af-
firming dismissal could just as easily have been based on lack of standing. As a result,
he cautioned that the decision should not be read as an affirmance of the district
court's holding. 434 U.S. at 1028-29. For similar conclusions involving two other
cases, see Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 465 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1978). Cf. 584 F.2d at 470
n.1 (Wright, J., dissenting); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307, 1308-12 (2nd Cir.
1973). This rule regarding threshold questions makes standing very confusing when a
court unnecessarily decides the issue. See also infra note 89 (discussing Reuss). For
additional discussion of Holtzman v. Schlesinger, see Note, Constitutional
Law-Justiciability- Veto Power-Standing,. . . Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d
1307 (2d Cir. 1973), 15 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 143 (1974). Note, War in Cambo-
dia-Political Question?, 38 ALA. L. REV. 245 (1974); Shatluck, The "Political Ques-
tion" Quagmire: War and Peace in the Second Circuit, 40 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1031(1974); Note, Justiciability of Presidential War Power, 48 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 215,
309 (1974).
73. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
74. See Note, supra note 51, at 1640 (calling it a "prospective vote" case). See
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senator alleged that the President's use of the pocket veto was
illegal and, as a result, a bill for which the senator had voted
did not become law. Judge Tamm, writing for a unanimous
court 7 5 applied alternate standing tests. First, applying the
logical nexus test of Flast, he found the necessary nexus be-
tween the plaintiff's status as a senator and the defendant's
illegal actions: "Disposition of the substantive issue will deter-
mine the effectiveness vel non of appellee's actions as a legis-
lator with respect to the legislation in question. This demon-
strates a relationship between appellee and his claim which is
not only 'logical' but real ....
In the alternative, the modern test was also applied by
the court. The nullification of the senator's vote fulfilled the
injury-in-fact requirement of prong one.7 The senator's inter-
ests were found to be within the zone of interests protected by
the separation of powers doctrine of the Constitution.78 This
satisfied prong two of the test.7 e Two similar cases have arisen
since this decision, and in both instances standing was
granted on the same grounds as in Kennedy v. Sampson. °
Legislators have not been wholly successful in gaining
standing where a past vote is involved. In one of several cases
involving the war in Southeast Asia, Harrington v. Schles-
inger,1 four United States congressmen challenged the use of
congressionally appropriated funds for the military effort.
also Comment, The Veto Power and Kennedy v. Sampson: Burning a Hole in the
President's Pocket, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 587, 601 (1974) (including a discussion of the
use of the pocket veto in state governments as well as in the federal government).
75. Judge Fay wrote a concurring opinion which was joined by Judge Bazelon.
511 F.2d at 446.
76. Id. at 433. Note the taxpayer "nexus" terminology used by the court. Cf.
Duke Power v. Carolina Envt'l Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 79-80 (1978) (holding the
Flast nexus requirement to be applicable only to taxpayer suits). See also 6A J.
MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 57.11 n.99 (2d ed. 1979 &
Supp. 1981).
77. 511 F.2d at 433-44.
78. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7. This section prevents overreaching by one branch of
government into the prerogatives of the others.
79. 511 F.2d at 434, 436.
80. Under almost identical facts, the Ninth Circuit found that a senator from
Guam had standing to challenge the use of the pocket veto by the governor. Bordallo
v. Camacho, 520 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1975). In 1976, Senator Kennedy again challenged
the use of the pocket veto. Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1976). Citing
only the prior Kennedy decision, Judge Sirica held that the Senator had standing. Id.
at 355-56.
81. 528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975).
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Among other allegations,"2 the plaintiffs alleged that they had
voted for a law limiting military involvement in the war and
that their votes were diluted by the continued use of funds for
the war effort by the Secretary of Defense. The court rejected
this argument and denied standing. It held that the congress-
men could not "claim dilution of their legislative voting power
because the legislation they favored [had already become]
law."8" In distinguishing Kennedy v. Sampson, the court
stated: "once a bill has become law, [the congressman's] inter-
est is indistinguishable from that of any other citizen. '84 This
reasoning is a frequent means of limiting judicial intervention
into the legislative-executive relationship where a past vote is
involved and the legislation has already been effectively en-
acted. The theory is that the legislators fail to distinguish
their interests from those of all citizens, a requirement of the
constitutional prong expressly stated in Baker.85
82. The Congressmen also alleged that the judicial determination was necessary
to enable them to effectively perform their other congressional duties. Id. at 455, 459.
83. Id. at 459.
84. Id.
85. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. Under the dicta of Valley Forge,
however, it could equally be argued that this constitutes a generalized grievance fall-
ing under prong two of the test. Since the legislator's interests are indistinguishable
from those of every citizen, their remedy lies also with the representative branches of
government through legislation and elections. See Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans For Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). See also
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975).
A creative twist in the diluted vote injury was made in McRae v. Matthews, 421
F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). In that case two United States Senators and one mem-
ber of the House of Representatives sought to intervene in a suit challenging "the
constitutional validity of one section of a correctly enacted law" for which they had
voted. Id. at 540. They reasoned that a judicial determination of unconstitutionality
would nullify their votes and that they had an interest in protecting those votes
through intervention. The court recognized the right of a legislator to sue where the
"right to sue derives from the legal injury done to the legislator's vote as integral to
the process of enactment. The litigation is addressed to establishing the efficacy of
the legislator's vote as a vote to be counted in the legislative process." Id. at 540
(citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) and Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430
(D.C. Cir. 1974)). The court found that the plaintiffs alleged no right to have their
votes counted to any greater degree than had already been done. It also found that
the plaintiffs did not allege that the enactment process was unlawful. McRae, 421 F.
Supp. at 540.
The court was further concerned that granting standing "would involve accepting
as a principle that each member of the Congress has an interest [in intervening] in
every case in which the substantive constitutionality of a provision in a federal enact-
ment ... [or] ... in which the interpretation of a federal statute [is] in question." Id.
at 540 (citing Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973)). Like Kennedy
v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974), McRae involved an actual vote already
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In Harrington v. Bush,8" Sampson was found to be inap-
plicable when the vote in question was not on specific legisla-
tion, but on appropriations to a general fund. Prong one could
not be met because it could not be clearly shown that a vote
was actually nullified. 7
In summarizing the injury to past votes, cases such as
Sampson and Coleman indicate that a legislator will be suc-
cessful when the diminished vote is on specific legislation
which the executive branch refused to enact in violation of the
Constitution, or which the executive branch enacted illegally.
Standing is granted because the legislator can show that a
vote was actually cast and that the right to have it counted
and given effect is within a zone of interests protected by the
Constitution. Refusal to give the vote effect is an injury in
fact suffered by the legislator which is traceable to the acts of
the executive branch. When the court requires the executive
cast. The court was correct in its result, but the reasoning could have more easily
followed than in Harrington v. Schlesinger, 528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975) and Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 162 (1962), where it was held that once a bill is enacted, a legislator
has no greater interest in its enforcement than does every citizen. This conclusion is
further substantiated by the fact that the court granted the legislators standing in
their capacity as citizens and taxpayers under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97. McRae,
421 F. Supp. at 540 (citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102-03 (1968)). As legislators,
there was not a sufficiently direct link between their status and the injury for pur-
poses of the first prong of the test. As citizens and taxpayers, the status was suffi-
ciently linked to the injury where an enacted law was not being effectuated.
86. 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
87. The congressman alleged dilution of past and future votes. His past votes
had been diminished because the Central Intelligence Agency might have been acting
beyond its statutory grant. He wanted secret information released to determine
whether or not the appropriations for which he had voted were being properly spent.
Id. at 201, 203-04. The court refused to extend Kennedy v. Sampson to a situation
involving past or future votes which did not involve specific legislation, or to a situa-
tion where a vote was not clearly nullified. Id. at 211. Additionally, the court found
that if a vote had been effected, it was a vote which had not been denied enactment.
Using the now familiar language on past votes for enacted laws, the court found that
the congressman had no greater interest in enforcing the law than did every citizen.
Id. at 213. See also supra note 85 and infra notes 124-35 and accompanying text.
The same panel also denied standing in Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council,
553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Metcalf, a United States Senator sought a declara-
tion by the court that the National Petroleum Council and its subgroups were unlaw-
fully functioning as congressional advisory committees because the members were se-
lected in such a way as to create a biased view. The congressman alleged that his past
votes had "been effectively nullified by the alleged lack of fair balance in membership
of the NPC." Id. at 185. Citing Harrington v. Bush, 533 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977), the
court held, without discussion, that the "asserted injuries do not satisfy the Constitu-
tional requirement of injury in fact." Id. This was an application of prong one
analysis.
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branch to enact the law, the legislator's injury is redressed.
Such a factual situation satisfies both prongs of the modern
test.
As illustrated by Harrington, the cases further indicate
that a legislator will not be granted standing where the alleged
diminished vote was on a law which has already been legally
enacted by the executive branch. In such a case there can be
no challenge to the enactment process. Once the law has been
legally enacted, the legislator's interest in having the law en-
forced is no different than that of every other citizen. As a
result, the court refuses to find that an injury, based upon the
plaintiff's status as a legislator, has occurred. Prong one of the
modern test requires that the plaintiff show just such a direct
personal injury. In addition, a legislator will be unsuccessful
in achieving standing when the vote alleged to have been di-
luted was on a legislative matter other than a specific law,
such as a vote on appropriations. This injury is considered to
be speculative because it is too difficult to show that a pro-
tected vote was clearly nullified. Prong one of the modern test
requires that the injury be concrete. It is also often impossible
to find a precise statute or constitutional protection for the
vote. As a result, prong two of the test may also be a barrier.
More specific guidelines in this area would be helpful so that
legislators would know when sufficient facts existed to bring a
case before the court.
The courts have been too narrow in interpreting the
standing doctrine where the injured vote was for a law already
enacted, or for appropriations where it can be shown a vote
actually occurred. Legislators have an interest in protecting
these votes from executive abuse. The practical effect of refus-
ing to enforce or abide by a legislative vote is the same as
refusing to enact a law for which a vote was cast. In both
cases, the practical effect is the same: the vote is nullified.
2. Future Votes
The injury based on diluted vote has been handled differ-
ently by the courts, depending on whether the vote was one
which had already occurred or one which was yet to be made.
The allegation of an injury to a future vote as a basis for
standing has generally been unsuccessful. Three cases are rep-
resentative of injured future votes. In the first, standing was
denied because no protected vote was found. The last two
19831
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were successful because the vote in question was protected ei-
ther by a statute or the Constitution.
Holtzman v. Schlesinger" is an example of an unsuccess-
ful attempt to get standing for injury to a future vote. A
United States congresswoman challenged the authority of the
President in sending military aircraft on bombing missions
over Cambodia without congressional approval. The congress-
woman alleged that her potential vote on such an approval
was rendered ineffective by the President's acts. A divided
court found that the congresswoman "had not been denied
any right to vote on Cambodia by any action of the defen-
dants. She has fully participated in the debates .... The fact
that her vote was ineffective was due to the contrary vote of
her colleagues." 9 In essence, with no actual vote losing its ef-
88. 484 F.2d 1307 (2nd Cir. 1973). See also supra note 72 (discussing injury to a
future vote in Pressler).
89. 484 F.2d at 1315. The case is of questionable value as precedent because the
court ruled against the plaintiff on another threshold issue. Id. at 1308-12 (political
question).
A similar analysis was made in that portion of Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190
(D.C. Cir. 1977), dealing with the alleged diluted future vote. The court held that a
member of the United States House of Representatives did not have standing to seek
a judicial declaration that certain Central Intelligence Agency activities or funding
methods were illegal. The congressman alleged two ways in which his future vote was
diminished. First, his effectiveness to cast future votes on appropriations was dimin-
ished because of the alleged illegal secrecy surrounding the funding. Second, his po-
tential vote on impeachment was also diminished without a determination of the le-
gality of the defendant's behavior. The court found both injuries to be too speculative
and too subjective. Id. at 202-03. It noted that no actual vote had been denied, and
that access to the information was not granted by statute or the Constitution. The
court could not find the necessary link between the defendants' alleged activities and
the congressman's vote; therefore, the case lacked the necessary concrete adverseness
to satisfy prong one. Id. at 212.
In a subsequent decision, the same court summarily found no standing for legis-
lators alleging injury to their future vote in Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council,
533 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir 1977). The Metcalf court relied exclusively upon its prior
decision in Harrington to support its position. Id. at 185.
Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1978) was a situation similar to Metcalf.
A United States Senator alleged that the method of appointing members to the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee of the Federal Reserve System was illegal. The method
used prevented him from casting an impeachment vote against a committee member,
thereby making members immune from congressional action. The congressman rea-
soned that his interest in such impeachment was within the zone of interests pro-
tected by the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. Relying on Kennedy and Coleman,
the court found that there was no dilution of any vote on specific legislation. The
court also found the plaintiffs interest in any such impeachment based upon the
Constitution to be no different than the interests of every citizen. 584 F.2d at 467-68.
Neither prong of the modern test was met. For further elaboration on Reuss, see
Note, Standing-Congressman Denied Standing as Legislator and Bondholder to
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fect, there was no injury in fact. The congresswoman's vote
was not protected by a statute. There was a Constitutional
zone of interest protecting the right to vote on war, but the
court found that the right to cast such a vote had not been
denied by any act of the defendants.9 0
In 1979, in Goldwater v. Carter,9 ' Senator Barry Goldwa-
ter and other congressmen challenged the President's termi-
nation of the mutual defense treaty with the Republic of
China. The congressmen alleged that the Constitution re-
quired a two-thirds approval of the Senate or a majority of
both houses of Congress to terminate a treaty. The Presi-
dent's action, therefore, deprived them of a right to vote.
These facts involved specific legislation and there was a con-
stitutional provision arguably protecting the senators' inter-
ests in their votes. The court found that "a live controversy
exists in appellees' claim of an opportunity to cast a binding
vote. The President's action has deprived them of this oppor-
tunity completely, in the sense that they have no legislative
power to exercise an equivalent voting opportunity." 92
Judges Wright and Tamm argued that the legislators did
not have standing.93 Faithful to Judge Tamm's earlier position
in another legislator case,94 Judge Wright argued that the con-
gressmen had a claim no different from that of all citizens in
seeing the leaders of the country act according to the Consti-
Challenge the Composition of the Federal Open Market Committee-Reuss v. Bal-
les, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 598 (1978), 52 TEMp. L.Q. 386
(1979).
90. Holtzman, 484 F.2d at 1315.
91. 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc). The decision has been the catalyst
for considerable discussion especially in the area of treaties. See Recent Develop-
ments, Jurisdiction: Political Questions-Goldwater v. Carter, - U.S. -
(1979), 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979), 21 HARV. INT'L L.J. 567 (1980); Case Comment, Goldwa-
ter v. Carter, 7 BROOKLYN J. INT'L. L. 111 (1981); Note, Treaty Termination and the
Separation of Powers: The Constitutional Controversy Continues in Goldwater v.
Carter, 100 S. Ct. 533 (1979) (Mem.) 9 DENVER J. INT'L L. & POLICY 239 (1980).
92. 617 F.2d at 705. Contra Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1056 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (considering even the standing decision in such a case to be premature). See
also Note, Congressional Power Under the Article IV Property Clause: Edwards v.
Carter, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 527, 537 n.65 and accompanying text (1979)(criticizing
the Court for denying certiorari creating the possibility that the appellate court deci-
sion may be treated as precedent in future decisions); Note, Constitutional Law
Treaty Power-Disposal of United States Territory-Panama Canal Treaties, 1979
Wis. L. REV. 837.
93. 617 F.2d at 709.
94. See Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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tution.9 5 He also argued that, even if Congress had the exclu-
sive power to approve treaty termination, no vote had been
taken. 6 This would indicate that Judge Wright considers a di-
luted future vote never to be sufficient injury for standing
purposes. Such a conclusion is irrational, however, because it
would require Congress to initially cast a futile vote in order
to protect what it considers to be its constitutional right to
vote on treaties.
The critical difference between Goldwater and Holtzman
is that in Holtzman the opportunity to cast future votes on
the issue still existed after the defendant's actions, while in
Goldwater the right to cast a future vote on the issue was
found to have been entirely eliminated by the defendant's ac-
tions. A constitutionally protected vote was actually lost so
that a concrete injury could be found which was within the
zone of interests protected by the Constitution.
A future vote has also been found to be protected by stat-
ute. In Williams v. Phillips,9 7 four United States Senators
brought an action to remove the acting director of the Office
of Economic Opportunity. The acting director was appointed
by the President. The injury alleged was the loss of their stat-
utorily protected right to vote for confirmation of the direc-
tor."8 Congress had expressly provided for senate approval99 so
that the senators' interests in protecting their votes fell
squarely within the zone of interests protected by the stat-
ute.100 If the court declared the executive acts illegal, the
95. 617 F.2d at 709-10.
96. Id. at 712-13. See also id. at 711 n.3. The United States Supreme Court
vacated the decision on the ground that it presented a political question. Goldwater
v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1980) (four justices argued that they would have granted
standing).
97. 360 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973).
98. Id. at 1366.
99. Id. "[OEO] shall be headed by a Director who shall be appointed by the
President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate." Economic Opportunity
Act of 1964 § 601(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2941(a) (1970). The issue of diminished vote is never
specifically mentioned by the court; however, since confirmation is made through the
voting process, a loss of vote is inferred.
100. But see Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 466 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (question-
ing the holding). The most recent case alleging injury to a future vote is Federation
for Am. Immigration Reform v. Klutznick, 486 F. Supp. 564 (D.D.C. 1980). Members
of the House of Representatives challenged the legality of the census. They alleged
that including illegal aliens in the census would diminish their vote. In a strained
logic, they reasoned that because the aliens were counted for purposes of reapportion-
ment, but could not vote in congressional elections, their chances of re-election and
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plaintiffs would regain their vote and therefore have their in-
jury redressed. With this argument, the plaintiffs were able to
meet both prongs of the modern test.
As illustrated in the case of Holtzman the future vote in-
jury can be particularly speculative and difficult to allege, es-
pecially where other voting alternatives exist. However, legis-
lators have a valid interest in preventing the loss of their
protected voting rights. If it can be shown that as in Williams
and Goldwater, a specific future vote has been lost which is
within the zone of interests protected by either the Constitu-
tion or a statute, and that no equivalent voting alternative ex-
ists, the court should grant standing. In this way, the courts
take an active role in maintaining the necessary checks and
balances between competing political interests within the
government.
B. Usurpation Of Legislative Power
Claims of usurpation of legislative power are closely re-
lated to those of a diluted vote. In fact, the two are often al-
leged together, particularly where the lost vote is a future vote
rather than a past one. 10' Because legislative power is almost
always a form of voting, the two injuries are often indistin-
guishable and should therefore be merged. In the usurpation
of power argument, the legislator will usually attempt to show
that a constitutional or statutory duty, other than voting, has
been denied due to the defendant's acts. Such a showing, it is
argued, would satisfy both prongs of the modern test. The fol-
lowing case is illustrative.
In Gravel v. Laird,10 2 two members of the United States
Senate and twenty members of the House of Representatives
sought to have the military activities in Southeast Asia de-
clared unlawful. They alleged that only Congress had the con-
stitutional authority to declare war, and that the military op-
their resulting ability to vote, was diminished or threatened. The court found this
injury too speculative and that the plaintiffs had "failed to demonstrate that the re-
lief they request[ed] [would] benefit them personally." Id. at 570-71. The congress-
men therefore failed to establish injury in fact or to satisfy the redressablility show-
ing of prong one.
101. See Reuss v. Balles 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discussed in supra note
89); Pressler v. Blumenthal, 434 U.S. 1028 (1978) (discussed in supra note 72).
102. 347 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1972).
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erations were being carried on without such a declaration.0 3
Congressional power was therefore usurped and they were in-
jured. The usurped power was remarkably like the lost poten-
tial vote in Holtzman; the injury, however, was not labeled a
voting injury. The court's analysis of standing was quite simi-
lar to that in Holtzman: "[the plaintiffs have not] shown suffi-
ciently that the action they challenge has caused them [indi-
vidual] injury in fact . . "10 The plaintiffs failed to satisfy
prong one of the modern test.
A better case would have existed if the President had per-
sonally declared war. The plaintiffs could then have argued
that a designated power of Congress to create legislation had
been usurped and no alternative means to act on the issue
existed. This would present a case with facts nearly identical
to those in Goldwater and Williams where standing was found
to exist. 100 Again, the only difference between Gravel and the
two successful future voting cases is that the usurped power
was not alleged as being a voting power. Such an allegation of
lost future vote seems to be the next logical step in this argu-
ment.10 For this reason, it is suggested that the theory of
103. Id. at 8.
104. Id. at 9. Cf. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S. 59 (1977) (limiting the nexus test to taxpayer suits).
105. Compare Holtzman v. Richardson, 361 F. Supp. 545 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). A
United States congresswoman made allegations similar to those in Gravel. Id. at 549
(citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8). The court found that as "a Congresswoman, plaintiff is
called upon to appropriate funds for military operations, raise an army, and declare
war." 361 F. Supp. at 546. The plaintiff was also defined as "a member of a narrowly
defined group, which has been more directly affected by the conduct in question than
has the general population .... " Id. The case was reversed on other grounds how-
ever. See Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973). Cf. Harrington v.
Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (finding congressmen in a similar situation had
no unique interest not shared equally by all citizens). The duties, protected by the
Constitution, which she was unable to perform, provided the necessary nexus for both
Flast tests. Cf. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 438
U.S. 59 (1977) (limiting the nexus test to taxpayer suits).
106. The cases likewise merge the language and reasoning of the two injuries.
See Daughtery v. Carter, 584 F.2d 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1978). In Daughtery, congressmen
challenged the legality of the Presidential pardon of those who violated selective ser-
vice laws during the Vietnam War. The congressmen alleged that the terms of the
pardon, which included reinstatement of full voting rights, violated the Immigration
and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976). They did "not contend that they
actually voted for the legislation that is the subject of [the] suit." 584 F.2d at 1057.
Instead, they alleged that the "President has usurped their power to enact repealing
legislation .... Id. The court found that the "failure or refusal of the executive
branch to execute accomplished legislation does not affect the legal status of such
legislation, nor does it invade, usurp or infringe upon a congressman's power to make
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usurpation of power be eliminated entirely as a separately ar-
ticulated injury. Instead, legislators should be required to
trace the usurpation to a specific vote, and allege loss of that
future vote as the injury suffered. This would result in a
merging of the usurpation of power injury with the diluted
future vote injury. 10 7
C. Diminished Effectiveness Absent a Judicial Declaration
Legislators have been somewhat successful using a third
law." Id. (emphasis added). "The injury suffered by the congressional appellants is in
no way unique to their status as legislators." Id. at 1057-58. This is the familiar lan-
guage for cases involving past votes and enacted law but is here applied to the usur-
pation of power injury.
107. Three additional cases in this area are worthy of noting. In Korith v. Bris-
coe, 523 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1975), a member of the Texas State Legislature alleged
that the exclusive power of the Congress to make treaties had been usurped by an
agreement between the State of Texas and Mexico. The court could find no connec-
tion between the plaintiff's status as a state legislator and the injury suffered. Id. at
1278 (relying on U. S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 182). None of the legislator's votes or
"any other legislative power" had been impeded. 523 F.2d at 1278.
Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1978), is another example of a case in-
volving both an allegation of a diluted vote and a usurpation of congressional power.
The congressman alleged that an "improper delegation of responsibilities to the
FOMC resulted in an usurpation of his powers" under the Constitution. Id. at 465.
The Court found that even if the congressman were given the relief sought, the "re-
sponsibilities currently delegated to the FOMC would remain so delegated . . .and
the fact (the congressman's] role vis-a-vis monetary policy would in no way be en-
hanced by such a declaration indicates that his legislative powers . . .are not cur-
rently adversely affected in any respect." Id. Although there was an injury in
fact-usurpation of the congressman's duty-and the congressman's interests were
within the zone of interests protected by the Constitution, he failed to satisfy the
additional prong one requirement of redressability.
Brown v. Ruckelhaus, 364 F. Supp. 258 (C.D. Cal. 1973), is a difficult case to
classify but seems to best fit this category. A United States Congressman alleged that
the Environmental Protection Agency had exceeded its statutory authority by im-
pounding congressionally appropriated funds earmarked for waste treatment facility
construction. It can be inferred from the case that the congressman had voted on the
appropriations and made proposals to the EPA for construction projects in his state.
Id. at 260. The court held that he lacked standing, however, because of his failure to
show that the impounding had injured him directly. The court noted that a direct
injury from such impounding of funds had been found in other cases. Id. at 262. No
proof was offered "indicating that proposals have been rejected because of frozen
funds .... [W]e find this omission fatal. There is no proof that any act by the Presi-
dent or the EPA has hurt, is injuring, or will impair ... Congressman Brown." Id. at
264 (emphasis added). It would appear, although not articulated thoroughly by the
court, that the plaintiff failed to show injury in fact or to place himself in the zone of
interests protected by any statute or the Constitution. The court also found that the
EPA was not compelled to spend all the authorized funds, and hence it did not usurp
any congressional authority by the impoundment. Id.
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argument to invoke judicial intervention. When a legislator
can show that legislative effectiveness in carrying out a statu-
tory or constitutional duty will be impaired in the absence of
a judicial decision, the courts will sometimes involve them-
selves. The court is usually asked to rule on one of two
problems: which conflicting constitutional interpretation is
correct, 08 or whether the actions of a government official are
legal. A ruling on an official action would aid the legislator, for
example, in effectively exercising legislative impeachment
powers.10 9 This level of judicial participation has been
strongly criticized by some courts. 10 Legislative effectiveness
in this sense does not directly involve voting or a usurpation
of power, but a broader decision making process.
This injury should be eliminated as a basis of standing
for two reasons. First, it is very subjective and speculative.
Second, it has been used most successfully where a legislator
needs the court's decision to consider impeachment on the
ground that the defendant's actions are illegal; yet, every citi-
zen may consider impeachment of an elected official. In this
sense a legislator's interests in impeachment are not unique.
Similarly, initiatives, recalls, and other alternatives are availa-
ble for impeaching officials. As a result, legislators have no
unique interest in such a determination by the court. The
only exception to this general elimination of diminished effec-
tiveness would be an instance where a clearly irreconcilable
split in constitutional interpretation existed within a legisla-
tive body. Judicial intervention could then be justified as a
matter of judicial and legislative economy, as well as part of
the historical role of the federal courts.
1. Resolution of Conflicting Constitutional
Interpretations
Trombetta v. Florida"' is an example of legislators re-
questing constitutional interpretation. The Florida Legisla-
ture was considering ratification of an amendment to the
United States Constitution."' A provision in the state consti-
108. See Trombetta v. Florida, 353 F. Supp. 575, 576 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
109. See Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
110. Id.
111. 353 F. Supp. 575 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
112. The legislature was considering ratification of the twenty-seventh amend-
ment. Id. For the full text of the amendment, see infra note 139.
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tution required that a majority of the legislators voting for
such an amendment be elected after the proposed amendment
was submitted to the state for ratification.'13 As a result of
this provision, a favorable vote for the amendment would be
frustrated. The legislators sought a determination of the con-
stitutionality of the provision. The court, in granting the legis-
lators standing, stated that their membership in the legisla-
ture gave them:
[A] direct responsibility and involvement in the constitu-
tional ratification process not shared by the citizenry or
electors of the state at large. The very issue now
presented to the [C]ourt, therefore, placed the plaintiffs
on the horns of an unresolved constitutional dilemma giv-
ing them "such a present stake in the outcome of the con-
troversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of the issues upon which the
court so largely depends for illumination of difficult con-
stitutional questions."' 1 '
In Dyer v. Blair,"8 members of the Illinois state legisla-
ture brought an action seeking a declaration that a provision
of the state constitution was unconstitutional. The provision
required that a super-majority vote of each house of the legis-
lature was necessary to pass a resolution ratifying an amend-
ment to the United States Constitution. The Court found that
such a super-majority requirement was lawful and a matter
that each state determine itself. 16 The plaintiffs were found
to have standing under Coleman v. Miller and Baker v. Carr.
The court, however, dealt with the issue by footnote only.117
In Dyer, a vote had already been taken but no injury to past
vote was alleged. Both Trombetta and Dyer present a prob-
lem similar to that in Coleman. The emphasis is more on the
plaintiff's interest in the outcome than on an injury. Since the
outcome is determined by an interpretation of the Constitu-
tion, the plaintiff's interests fall squarely within the article III
limitations on federal court jurisdiction. The process for
amending the Constitution of the United States is at issue
and is of such importance that a judicial grant of standing to
113. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 1 (1968).
114. 353 F. Supp. at 576 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)).
115. 390 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
116. Id. at 1306.
117. Id. at 1297 n.12.
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hear the issues is justified both practically and
constitutionally.
2. The "Bears Upon" Standard of Diminished
Effectiveness
A much different situation exists where the legislator
seeks a judicial declaration because his effectiveness may be
influenced in a more general, subjective way. As noted previ-
ously, this situation usually involves potential impeachment of
a public official by the legislative branch.
This injury, as a basis for standing, created a split in the
circuit courts by 1973. In Mitchell v. Laird,"' thirteen mem-
bers of the United States House of Representatives sought an
injunction to stop U.S. military activities in Indochina. They
also sought a declaration that the activities were unconstitu-
tional. Such a declaration, they argued, would aid them in de-
ciding whether or not to impeach the President. " 9 In what
may well be the most concise test for an injury to a legislator's
effectiveness, the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia stated:
A declaration to that effect would bear upon the duties of
118. 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973). See Recent Decisions, Constitutional
Law-Standing of Members Of Congress To Challenge Executive Action In The
War In Indo-China-Mitchell v. Laird, 33 MD. L. REv. 504 (1973). See also, Holtz-
man v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir.), rev'g, 361 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
The congresswoman argued that a declaration that the President's actions were illegal
would bear upon her duty to consider impeachment. The court noted, however, that,
the issue was nonjusticiable: "[a determination of the fact that the] establishment of
the illegality here would be relevant in possible impeachment proceedings against the
President would in effect be asking the judiciary for an advisory opinion which is
precisely and historically what the 'case and controversy' conditions ... forbid." 484
F.2d at 1314. Cf. Judge Oake's dissent. Id. at 1315-18. In addition to finding that the
congresswoman's voting right had been injured, the district court had also held that
the "plaintiff [had] a continuing responsibility to insure the checks and balances of
our democracy through the use of impeachment." 361 F. Supp. at 449. The appellate
court effectively negated any injury to the congresswoman's duties, despite the logical
appeal of her argument.
119. The court first refused to find the issue moot because the hostilities were
purportedly halted:
[A] declaratory judgment respecting past action might have legal im-
port, inasmuch as though this point is not specifically pleaded, plaintiffs
have a duty under the Constitution to consider whether defendants in
continuing the hostilities did commit high crimes and misdemeanors so
as to justify an impeachment of the individual defendants, pursuant to
the United States Constitution .... 
488 F.2d at 613.
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plaintiffs to consider whether to impeach defendants, and
upon plaintiffs quite distinct and different duties to make
appropriations to support the hostilities, or to take other
legislative actions related to such hostilities .... In our
view, the considerations are sufficient to give the plaintiffs
a standing to make their complaint.120
This case established the "bears upon" standard which allows
standing in any case in which a legislator can allege that a
judicial determination is necessary because it would bear upon
the decisions necessary to carry out legislative duties.1 2'
In Holtzman v. Schlesinger,122 the Second Circuit found
similar injuries to be inadequate to support standing. Addi-
tionally, the court found that the request for such a judicial
determination was in essence a request for an advisory
opinion. 23
120. Id. at 614 (citing, among other cases, Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v.
Camp, 379 U.S. 150 (1970)).
121. See also Judicial Decisions, War-Constitutionality of War in Indo-
China-President's Power To Continue Hostilities- Whether Formal Declaration of
War Necessary-Political Question, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 787 (1973).
Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973) was the final decision on legisla-
tive standing by a District of Columbia court in 1973. Three members of Congress
sought a declaration that the discharge of Watergate Special Prosecutor, Archibald
Cox, was illegal. The court noted the unusual circumstances in Congress surrounding
the Watergate proceedings: "[n]umerous bills are pending in the Senate and the
House of Representatives which attempt to insulate the Watergate inquiries and
prosecutions from Executive interference, and impeachment of the President because
of his alleged role in the Watergate matter. ... Id. at 106 (quoting Mitchell v.
Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). The court held that "the standing of the three
congressional plaintiffs to pursue their effort to obtain a judicial determination as to
the legality of the Cox discharge falls squarely within the recent holding [of Mitchell)
.... 366 F. Supp. at 106.
122. 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973) (discussed supra note 118). See also supra
text accompanying note 88.
123. Id. at 1315. A similar conclusion was reached in Harrington v. Schlesinger,
528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975). Four congressmen sued for a declaration that U.S. mili-
tary activities in Southeast Asia were illegal. The question for determination was
whether the alleged constitutional actions by the executive branch, as well as alleged
statutory violations, were illegal. The relevant statute reads:
None of the funds herein appropriated under this Act may be expended
to support directly or indirectly combat activities in or over Cambodia,
Laos, North Vietnam and South Vietnam . . . by the United States
forces, after August 15, 1973, no other funds heretofore appropriated
under any other Act may be expended for such purpose[s].
Pub. L. No. 93-50, § 307. Additionally, a second statute provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, on or after August 15, 1973,
no funds herein or heretofore appropriated may be obligated or ex-
pended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities by United
States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North Viet-
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
The District of Columbia Circuit subsequently adopted a
similar view, in Harrington v. Bush,'2 4 which resolved the cir-
cuit court conflict. A unanimous court rejected the "bears
upon" standard of Mitchell as being insufficient to support
standing and as being contrary to the article III limitations.
The court considered the "bears upon" standard of injury as
too subjective: "Since there are no allegations of particular in-
jury, appellant's claim with respect to the relevance of a de-
claratory judgment to his congressional duties must fail."' 6
The fact that the "bears upon" standard also involves a future
injury, rather than an actual one, further weakened its ability
to help a plaintiff show the necessary "concreteness of the
controversy, "126 required by prong one. The court pinpointed
the ultimate weakness of the "bears upon" theory: "This test
lessens the strength of the necessary connection between the
complaining party and controversy which he seeks to have ad-
judicated .... Therefore, we conclude that the 'bears upon'
language and the notion it imports are inconsistent with the
constitutional requirement of injury in fact .... ,,1 2  The court
noted, as to the alleged illegal activities, that the congress-
man relied solely on Mitchell in defining his interests in im-
peachment.' The congressman claimed that a judicial decla-
ration would "'bear upon' his duties and rights 'to consider,
initiate, support or vote for the impeachment of the defen-
nam, South Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.
Pub. L. No. 93-52, § 108. No specific diminution of effectiveness was alleged. The
court relied on Holtzman to find that the plaintiffs sought an advisory opinion. 528
F.2d at 459. As for interpreting the statutes, the court found that because differences
in interpretation existed in Congress itself, that "if there is a difference ... Congress
has the resources through its committees to ascertain the facts. With facts before it, it
may tighten statutory restrictions." Id. See also Note, supra note 51, at 1638.
124. 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
125. 553 F.2d at 208. See also id. at 209 n.99.
126. Id. at 208. The court also criticized Mitchell for going to the standing
question unnecessarily. Because the Mitchell court found the questions in the case to
be nonjusticiable, any decision on standing was purely dicta. Id. at 207. Ironically, the
court in Harrington v. Bush made a similar mistake in its interpretation of the stand-
ing doctrine: "the inquiry into the existence of injury is the crucial inquiry; if it is
determined that no injury exists, there is no need to pose or answer the other inquir-
ies in the case law." Id. at 205 n.68. Since the court found the plaintiff to have failed
to allege an injury in fact, any discussion of the "other inquiries in the case law"
would be dicta. With regard to such inquiries, the court discussed the causation re-
quirement and the redressability requirements of standing. Id. at 208-09.
127. Id. at 209.




The court made two important observations with regard
to the "bears upon" standard and the plaintiffs' allegations:
first, the plaintiff did not allege that the judicial determina-
tion would force him to take impeachment action; second, he
did not allege how he would benefit in any way from such a
declaration. 130 As to the first observation, the court found that
the alleged illegal acts "are not linked with any degree of
specificity to the appellant's Congressional interests. The es-
sence of the injury in fact concept is the frustration of some
right or interest."'13' About the second observation, the court
stated: "appellant claims no particular interest in the outcome
and it appears either result would serve his asserted need for
information .... This lack of a personal stake in the out-
come "weakened [the] relationship between the party and the
controversy." 33 The result of this weakness was a "transform-
ing of a complaint for declaratory [judgment] into an advisory
opinion."' 3 4
Besides heavily undermining Mitchell, the holding in
Harrington v. Bush created doubts as to whether a congress-
man could ever again rely on the "diminished effectiveness"
or "bears upon" theory for standing. The court did acknowl-
edge, however, that such a case might still exist: "We do not
hold that a Congressman may never seek a declaratory
judgment of executive illegality, but that such a request
must be accompanied by allegations of particular concrete in-
jury ... .5
129. Id. (quoting the complaint).
130. Id. at 200.
131. Id. at 208.
132. Id. at 209.
133. Id.
134. Id. See also Comment, supra note 8, at 1376-78.
135. 553 F.2d at 210. See also Hall v. Siegal, 467 F. Supp. 750 (S.D. Ill. 1977).
Hall involved Illinois State Legislators who sought to enjoin defendants from alleged
illegal lobbying. The injury was not actual but "clearly threatened because of actions
and admissions thereof by defendants with respect to legislators in other states." Id.
at 753. The extent of the injury was the lobbying itself as well as the fact that the
"visits and telephone calls to legislators by defendants [would] absorb substantial
time and energy which they should be devoting to the interests of their own constitu-
ents." Id. The legislators were also found to have interests which fell within the zone
of interests protected by a state law prohibiting such lobbying. Id. This case repre-
sents the first time legislators alleged an interruption of their duties as a ground for
diminished effectiveness. Although applicable, the plaintiffs did not allege that the
lobbying "bears upon" their effectiveness or performance of these duties.
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While the "bears upon" argument is an honest attempt
by legislators to determine how most to effectively carry out
their legislative duties, it is simply too subjective to survive
the standing tests. Absent an important need for interpreting
a constitutional provision, the courts have been wise not to
intervene when a legislator needs a judicial declaration simply
to help carry out legislative duties. While considering im-
peachment important, the proceedings can go on without the
courts. Additionally, a court decision which would aid the leg-
islator might occur anyway, but only because specific charges
had been made against the individual who is subject to
impeachment.
IV. STANDING IN THE ERA CASE: Idaho v. Freeman
The recent case of Idaho v. Freeman"s' involved four
state legislators from Washington who intervened in a case in-
itially brought by state legislators from Idaho and Arizona. In
addition to suing in their capacity as individual legislators,
the Idaho and Arizona legislators also sued in a relator action.
As a result, the legislature of each state was a named party as
was the leadership of each house in both legislatures. 137 Argu-
Standing, for those alleging diminished effectiveness, continued its decline with
Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The congress-
man alleged that "until the legal issues surrounding the operation of the NPC are
resolved by a federal court, he 'is uncertain how best to take effective legislative ac-
tion to correct the illegalities he perceives.'" Id. at 185 (quoting Brief for Appellant
at 29). Relying on Harrington v. Bush, the court dismissed this claim for failure to
allege an injury in fact. The congressman further alleged that "the imbalance of the
NPC has caused him injury to his committee work in the senate," 553 F.2d at 185
because the NPC, through its subcommittees, provides information to senate commit-
tees of which the congressman is a member. Specifically, he alleged that he "is im-
peded in his efforts to develop the best possible legislative product." Id. at 185-86. He
conceded, however, that he had other sources of information. The court found this
insufficient to confer standing, stating: "[w]e conclude that there has been no judi-
cially cognizable injury stated. This conclusion flows from the fact that appellant has
alleged no 'particular concrete injury' which amounts to a 'claim of specific present
objective harm or threat of harm.'" Id. at 187-88. The injury was also called too
speculative. Id. at 188.
136. 529 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Idaho 1981); Carmen v. Idaho, 103 S. Ct. 22 (1982).
137. Id. See also Plaintiffs' Complaint For Declaratory And Injunctive Relief.
This case might very well represent "the first time an article V case has ever been
brought on behalf of a legislature, a specifically named entity in article V." Letter
from Maxwell A. Miller, Senior Attorney, Mountain States Legal Foundation, Den-
ver, Colorado (October 18, 1982) (emphasis added). Copy on file with the offices of
Santa Clara Law Review [hereinafter referred to as Miller Letter]. Article V, in perti-
nent part, may be found infra note 138.
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ing that their votes were within the zone of interests protected
by article V of the Constitution,lss the plaintiffs sought a dec-
laration that the votes rescinding prior ratification of the
Equal Rights Amendment were valid and effective; that the
seven-year Congressional extension of the ERA ratification
period was unconstitutional; and that the running of the first
seven-year ratification period terminated all state ratifications
which occurred prior to the day on which the seven-year pe-
riod ended.'89 The plaintiffs further sought an injunction re-
quiring the defendant"" to remove the state of Idaho's name
from all documents indicating the names of states ratifying
the ERA. Additionally, the plaintiffs sought an injunction en-
joining the defendant from counting toward ratification any
purported state ratifications which took place after the seven-
year limit expired.""
The author acknowledges his gratitude to Mr. Miller, and to Mr. Roger Marzulla,
past President and Chief Legal Officer of Mountain States Legal Foundation, for
their assistance in preparing this comment.
138. Article V provides, in pertinent part, that:
The Congress, whenever two-thirds of both houses shall propose amend-
ments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the Legislatures of
two-thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing
Amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid to all Intents and Pur-
poses, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of
three-fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three-fourths
thereof, as the one or the other mode of Ratification may be proposed
by the Congress ....
U.S. CONST. art. V (emphasis added). Nearly every significant part of article V has
been dealt with by the courts. See National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 386
(1920) ("whenever two-thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose
Amendments. .. .")6 Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921) ("which . . . shall be valid
to all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution"); Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp.
1287, 1308 (N.D. Ill. 1974) ("ratified"); Hawke v. Smithe, No. 1, 253 U.S. 221 (1920)
("Legislature"); United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931) ("one or the other
mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress").
139. The proposed twenty-seventh amendment, known as the Equal Rights
Amendment, is set out below:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article.
Section 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date
of ratification.
H. J. RES. 208, 86 Stat. 1523 (1972) [hereinafter cited as ERA].
140. The defendant was the Administrator of the General Services Administra-
tion. Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107, 1111 (D. Idaho 1981).
141. Id. Ripeness and political question were also issues. Id. at 1111, 1116. The
court correctly noted that finding against the plaintiffs on any justiciability issue
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Since the court concluded that the individual legislators
from Idaho had alleged injuries which encompassed all of the
issues alleged by the other plaintiffs, the court discussed only
the Idaho plaintiffs.'42 The injuries the Idaho plaintiffs alleged
fell into the diminished vote category. As the court stated:
"The basis for the Idaho legislators' claim of standing in this
suit is that as participants in the ratification process, their in-
dividual votes, in favor of ratification for the seven-year time
period or for the rescission of the prior ratification have been
debased by the actions of the defendant ....
The Idaho plaintiffs' votes also fit neatly into the dimin-
ished vote category because the vote for rescission was actual,
not prospective.14 4 The votes related to specific legislation,
and were not merely votes for appropriations. 4" Both of these
factors have been decisive in allowing standing. In Kennedy v.
Sampson, 46 a nullification of such a specific, actual past vote
was found to fulfill the injury in fact requirement.1 47
The Freeman court relied on Data Processing to deter-
mine standing:
The refusal to recognize the plaintiffs' act of rescinding
would preclude its consideration of the others. Id. at 1116. For purposes of this dis-
cussion, which attempts to apply the tests of standing for legislators as previously
outlined, it will be assumed that the other justiciability challenges have been met by
the plaintiffs.
142. Id. at 1121. In his letter, Mr. Miller observes that in only finding standing
for the Idaho plaintiffs, the court kept two issues before it: first, the issue of recission,
and second, the issue of ratification limited to the initial seven-year period only. In
Mr. Miller's words, "standing on one issue moots the necessity for finding standing on
another." Miller Letter, supra note 137. He further asserts that "[s]tanding to raise
the extension issue would have resided, if at all, in the Arizona plaintiffs." Id. Mr.
Miller speculates that the court found standing on both issues so that it could, in the
alternative, reach the merits of each. Id.
143. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. at 1118. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
144. Id. at 1114.
145. "In February of 1977 the state legislature of Idaho took action to rescind
its prior ratification of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment .... Thus, by a sim-
ple majority Idaho declared its prior ratification 'rescinded, voided, repealed, with-
drawn, recalled and disaffirmed .....' " Id. at 1113-14 (footnotes omitted) (corrections
in the original).
146. 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974) See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying
text.
147. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. See also Bordallo v. Camacho,
520 F.2d 763 (9th Cir. 1975); Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C. 1976); Har-
rington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Metcalf v. National Petroleum Coun-
cil, 553 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1977). The appropriateness of this portion of the Kennedy
v. Sampson decision was reaffirmed by the court in Harrington v. Bush.
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the prior ratification as fully and completely retracting
the prior expression impinges on the legislator's right to
participate in the ratification process and gives rise to a
cause of action. The plaintiffs in this instance have estab-
lished direct injury in fact .... '"
The legislators' interests in their votes were found to be pro-
tected by the zone of interests protected by article V of the
Constitution, " ' as required by prong two of the modern test.
The court found that "the plaintiffs here are specially empow-
ered under article V to participate in the amendment pro-
cess."150 It went on to hold that the injuries suffered were part
of plaintiffs' constitutionally protected interest of participat-
ing in the process of amending the Constitution and thus that
the first bar to standing had been met. The court correctly
relied on Coleman v. Miller51 for this portion of the standing
test." The plaintiffs in Coleman were also state legislators
voting to amend the Constitution. "
In applying the other elements of prong one, the Freeman
court held that the plaintiffs' injuries were not equally shared
by all citizens,5 and that the injury could be traced to the
acts of the defendants. 5' Finally, the court found that plain-
tiffs met the redressability requirement: "It is clear that the
plaintiffs' alleged injury can be redressed by a declaration by
the Court regarding the constitutionality of the various acts of
rescission and extension. "156
With regard to the legality of the extension of the ERA
ratification period, the plaintiffs' injury should have also been
alleged to have been a lost voting opportunity, or lost prospec-
tive vote. The extension would be viewed as a whole new part
of the amendment process which the states were entitled to
approve through a second vote. The court did not discuss the
issues in this manner, nor did plaintiffs allege it in this way.15
148. 529 F. Supp. at 1120-21.
149. See supra note 138 for the text of article V.
150. 529 F. Supp. at 1120.
151. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
152. 529 F. Supp. at 1119.
153. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
154. 529 F. Supp. at 1120. Lack of such a finding has been sufficient to deny
standing. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
155. 529 F. Supp. at 1121 (this satisfied the causal requirement).
156. Id.
157. See Brief for Plaintiffs at 37, Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107 (D.
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The plaintiffs argued, instead, that the extension voided all
previous ratification votes since it was not a part of the origi-
nal ratified proposal. Failure to recognize this nullification was
a failure to give the intended effect to the past votes which
the plaintiffs cast: approval of the ERA as originally submit-
ted to the states, including the time limitation for ratification.
The injury in fact resulting from the extension is identical to
the injury from the rescission not being recognized. In either
case, a past vote is not given its proper effect.
The lost prospective vote argument would stem from the
theory that the plaintiffs had been denied a constitutionally
protected voting privilege involving specific legislation. The
plaintiffs would argue that the extension was a modification of
the initial proposal, and therefore as a new amendment it
must also be submitted to the states for approval. Congress, in
essence, sidestepped the article V requirement of submitting
this new amendment to the states. Under this theory, plain-
tiffs could have come under the voting case of Williams v.
Phillips,58 where standing was found. The satisfaction of the
zone of interests of prong two, as well as the redressability'5
and causation tests, would have remained the same for either
type of vote.1 60
Additionally, the prospective vote analysis would ulti-
mately have led the plaintiffs to allege usurpation of the legis-
lators' effectiveness, even though it has been argued that the
two theories should be merged. Plaintiffs could have argued,
as was done in Gravel v. Laird6" and Goldwater v. Carter,16 2
that their constitutionally protected right to ratify the modi-
fied amendment had been usurped by the refusal of Congress
Idaho 1981).
158. 360 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C. 1973). See supra notes 97-100 and accompany-
ing text.
159. See supra note 72.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 154-56. Mr. Miller argues, perhaps cor-
rectly, that the prospective vote injury implies the right of legislatures under article V
to cast a "negative vote" on the revised amendment, a right not necessarily within the
rights given the states under article V. Miller Letter, supra note 137. This author
would argue, as pointed out earlier, that the modification of the amendment created a
new amendment which required new ratification by all states. This theory does not
view the voting on the extension itself as one the states possess, but the voting on a
heretofore totally unratified new amendment. Article V requires a positive vote here.
161. 347 F. Supp. 7 (D.D.C. 1972). See supra text accompanying notes 102-05.




to present it to the states for a vote. Because the redres-
sability requirement was met, results such as those in Brown
v. Rucklehaus'6 and Reus v. Balles164 would not occur.
The case contained nearly all the necessary elements for
standing based upon the diminished effectiveness injury. The
missing element was a legislator from a state which had not
yet voted on the amendment. Such a plaintiff would need a
declaration by the court on the constitutionality of the exten-
sion. Likewise, a legislator from a state which was considering
rescission could also ask for a determination of whether rescis-
sion was possible under the Constitution. Both of these would
meet the Coleman v. Miller"6 test and the problems they
presented would have been substantially like those of
Trombetta v. Florida'66 and Dyer v. Blair.167
While the court considered the Arizona legislators' claims
to be encompassed by those of the Idaho plaintiffs, " it is ar-
guable that the Arizona legislators suffered the injury of di-
minished effectiveness while legislators from Idaho did not.
The Arizona Legislature had considered the ERA amendment
throughout the original seven-year period and had consist-
ently voted against ratification.' " Absent a declaration by the
courts as to the constitutionality of the extension, the legisla-
ture could not effectively consider ratification during the ex-
tension period. The Arizona plaintiffs alleged, instead, that
their past votes against the amendment were not given effect,
an allegation which allowed the court to view their injury as
being identical with that of the Idaho plaintiffs. 70 Under this
argument, the Arizona votes helped defeat the amendment by
preventing its passage during the original seven-year period.
The Supreme Court, unfortunately, found the issues in
Freeman to be moot because the second ratification period
had lapsed without the necessary number of states voting for
163. 364 F. Supp. 258 (C.D. Cal. 1973). See supra note 107.
164. 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1978). See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
See also supra note 107.
165. 307 U.S. 433 (1939). See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
166. 353 F. Supp. 575 (M.D. Fla. 1973). See supra text accompanying notes 111,
114.
167. 390 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1975). See supra text accompanying notes 115-
17.
168. See supra text accompanying note 142.
169. Brief for Plaintiffs at 11.
170. Id. at 11-14.
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ratification. 7 ' Had it reached the question of standing, it
should have found that the plaintiffs met the necessary stand-
ing requirements. Because the ERA has been resubmitted to
the states in identical form, it is very likely that the issues in
Freeman may again be raised.
V. CONCLUSION
Allowing individuals to sue based on injuries suffered be-
cause of their special status as legislator serves an important
political and social function. The standing tests used in these
cases are as complex and frustrating as the law of standing is
in general. The tests for legislator standing should be im-
proved. 171 Injury to a vote should be expanded to allow stand-
ing for a lost future vote whenever a legislator can reasonably
show that the voting right is in fact lost, and that the right to
cast the vote is protected. Ursurpation of legislative power
should be merged with the future vote injury, and standing
should be allowed when the future vote test is met. The
"bears upon" standard should not be revived because of the
inherent ambiguity in the test itself. The legislators should in-
stitute impeachment proceedings, rather than asking for judi-
cial intervention through declaratory relief. However, where a
judicial declaration is necessary to settle a difference in con-
stitutional interpretation within or between branches of gov-
ernment, the courts should, as a matter of expediency, step in
as the ultimate interpreters of the Constitution.
Ernest A. Benck, Jr.
171. Carmen v. Idaho, 103 S. Ct. 22 (1982).
172. See Note, supra note 18, for an alternative solution to the standing
confusion.
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